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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
The paradox of the naturalisation of cognitive empathy
Federica Madonna∗
1Ph.D. in Moral Philosophy Abstract
The essay aims to show that the cancellation of the commonly shared
division between basic empathy and cognitive or mentalising empathy
is leading the debate to a paradox: explaining the latter starting from the
first, thus annulling the differences.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years we hear more and more often talksof “mindreading” or “reading of the mind” asif, becoming all wizards or sorcerers, we have
the “inhuman” ability to initiate a reading of other
people’s thoughts or volitions.
Certainly the evocative and captivating expression of
mentalising offers to the imagination some reflective
cues and creations of sophistication that can be well
imagined, but a careful reflection, relieving us from
the suggestions that the expression can provide, re-
veals the banner of a debate so much as intricate as
it could never have been imagined.
When the expression “mind reading” is mentioned,
immediately the more conscious reader refers his
thoughts, his “mind”, to the cognitive problem of
empathy; that is, that aspect of empathy which, by
involving a cognitive effort on the part of the person
concerned, would make the epistemically compre-
hensible that, at that moment, the observed feels,
perceives or thinks.
In dealing with the concept of empathy, it is impor-
tant to note that the conditio sine qua non in order to
be recognised as “mind reading” the presence of an
observer and a hypothetical victim who experiences
an empathic suffering should be met. As Hoffman[1]
teaches us, cognitive empathy does not require a di-
rect observation (therefore, of a co-presence of both
actors), but of the cognitive effort of the observer, of
the processing time and decoding of themessage; it is
no coincidence that the object of cognitive empathy
is poetry, books or paintings.
For several decades, however, it has become com-
mon to speak of cognitive empathy even among
humans and humans and non-humans[1]. It might
be thought, in fact, that entering into the mind of
the other derives from a mental capacity that has
been developed in the course of human evolution; in
fact, there is no lack of authors or participants in the
debate who believe this is the key to solve the origin
1[1] Cfr. Martin Hoffman, Empatia e sviluppo morale, Il
Mulino, Bologna, 2008.
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of cognitive empathy, which, on the basis of Dar-
winian teaching, has manifested itself as a survival
mechanism of the most suitable to live in a social
group[2]. The problem in the problem, then, would
become trying to explain from what it is generated
or from what this ability depends and, above all,
what nature has. It is in this sense that the discourse
relating to cognitive empathy fully embraces the
intent of naturalisation, not so much moral as it is
mental: to explain the mind, the cogito through the
neurobiological mechanisms that make up the brain.
This is the intention of these last few years, which
between transcendental transcendence and transcen-
dence transcendental contributes to the flourishing of
positions, themes and problems that are not easy to
solve.
The sophistication of the mental debate has, by now,
also affected the empathic process, cognitively un-
derstood, so much so that some philosophers (espe-
cially Americans) are making various proposals for
its naturalization, starting a debate, in the opinion of
the writer, paradoxical.
It is a problem that comes from afar, of which,
however, the echo is still felt.
When Cartesio advanced the doubt res cogitans or
res extensa in the seventeenth century, he proposed,
probably without awareness, to posterity a dilemma
that would have addressed and influenced much of
the speculation that followed him; because speaking,
today, in the twenty-first century of cognitive empa-
thy is a result (I don’t know how right or wrong) of
that doubt, of that dilemma.
If it is true that in the last centuries there have been
different and multiple positions on the problem of
the mind that have advanced resolutions between
metaphysics and physics, it is equally true that, hav-
ing only provided the expression “naturalisation”
of one’s own denotate in recent years, it is then
recognised since the early 2000s (symbolic date 2002
with the proposal by Adina Roskies of the expression
“neuroethics”[1]) a naturalisation of the mental and,
not by chance, just from those years the current prob-
lem of empathy reappeared to the great philosophical
public.
And of this, Cartesio, if you allow me, was co-author
/ initiator.
In order to stem the metaphysical problem of the
nature of the mind, over the last seventy years of
the analytic philosophical tradition the use of the
concept of cognitive empathy / mindreading has
been exploited to explain the way in which a man,
inserted in a group, is able to “understand” the
other; entrusting this knowledge sui generis with
a scientific, epistemic character, which led several
philosophers to scientifically investigate this ability.
In the contemporary, several proposals have been
reached, including the one put forward by the Amer-
ican philosopher Peter Carruthers[2] who explains
the cognitive empathy through the use of model of
mental explaination from the name Mindrearding is
prior; this would be able to explain the intersub-
jectivity through the “form” of the reading of the
mind, which, constituting a privileged access of the
subject to his own cognition, would contribute to the
explanation of what the other is thinking, trying or
perceiving.
The model of the mental of Carruthers is based on
the intent to use the concept of cognitive empathy
as an instrument of explanation of the mental ar-
chitecture able, in its turn, to explain the way in
which this instrument works on the other, through
subjective, personal access to one’s mind. In this
sense, mindreading becomes prior, since access to
one’s cognition would occur primarily through the
“channel” of mind reading. Cognitive empathy.
2I will not go into this second aspect, since the focus of 
the pages that will follow will be the problem of cognitive 
empathy only and exclusively to human beings. This choice 
is not dictated by racism or speciesism, but simply because it 
would interest me to understand how man possesses this ability 
sui generis to understand the other by himself.
3Cfr. ALISON GOPNIK E ANDREW N. MELTZOFF,
Words, Thoughts and Theories, MIT Press, Massachusetts,
1997; ALAN M. LESLIE, How to acquire a representational
theory of mind, in DAN SPERBER (A CURADI), “Metarepre-
sentations: AMultidisciplinary Perspective”, Oxford university
Press, Oxford, 2000, pp. 197-224; JUSTIN C. FISHER, Does
Simulation Theory Really Involve Simulation?, in “Philosophi-
cal Psychology”, 19(4), 2006, pp. 417-432.
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If that of the American philosopher is just one of the
many examples in literature today, the controversial
issue, according to the writer, lies precisely in the
approach that becomes paradoxical to the use of
cognitive empathy.
In general, in the debate on the “tangle of empathy”
two aspects of the phenomenon are usually distin-
guished: one so-called “basic or primary” and one
secondary.
If with the first one is intended that cultural / neuro-
scientific ferment linked to the progressive and con-
tinuous discoveries of one or other areas of the brain
able to contribute to the “empathy” phenomenon
(the already discovered mirror neurons constitute
the most famous example); with the second one
there is a distinct cognitive approach to the phe-
nomenon in which the “intellectual” effort of the
observer towards the other is analysed, able to know
epistemically the “mind” of others”. On this strand,
as mentioned, the above example of the American
philosopher and of the many like him who reflect on
the role played by mindreading should be inserted.
The paradox lies precisely in this intent.
Assuming that the writer shares and fully embraces
the naturalisation of the mental program, if the liter-
ature on empathy usually distinguishes two different
approaches to the problem (neuroscientific, on the
one hand; cognitive, on the other) and the actors
participating in the debate share, in turn, “the rules
of the game”, trying to explain mindreading through
neuro-biological mechanisms means betraying dif-
ferentiation. It means, though, to use the tools of
basic empathy to explain an aspect of the same
empathy that interests another field of interest (un-
derstanding epistemically the other), since, as a re-
minder, mindreading involves a cognitive effort on
the part of the agent that is not present in the case
of primary empathy. This means that the problem of
4Cfr. ADINA ROSKIES, Neuroethics for the New Millen-
nium, in “Neuron”, Vol. 35 (1), 2002, pp. 21-23.
5Cfr. PETER CARRUTHERS, Mindreading underlies
metacognition, in “Behavioral and Brian Sciences”, Vol. 32,
Issue 2, 2009.
mentalising in the time of neuroscience is flattened
out; for which:
• Or expect the latter to be able to tell us some-
thing about how the mind works, such as to
explain, subsequently, the nature of cognitive
empathy;
• Or all the speeches that will be made starting
from the intent of naturalization of the mental
and cognition before that moment will be vain
and empty. Vani, because one would speculate
on missing data; empty, because there are no
data to think about.
This seems to me to be the state of the current debate
on mindreading; which gives the impression that
he has lost the red thread of Arianna: that is, he
has forwarded himself into a labyrinth from which,
from my point of view, there is no exit, not because
of the complexity of the debate itself, but because
of an error interpretative of the nature of cognitive
empathy. It seems to me more like a transcendental
ploy to explain intersubjectivity, rather than human
ability. That is, we must continue to come to terms
with Cartesian res.
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